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I'm going to start praising Professor Loeber; and at a
certain point I will probably stop praising him for what he
said and start praising him for what I will be saying. I
think he gave an excellent description of the range of areas
in Soviet society and in East European communist societies,
in which manifestations of nonconformity become not only
matters for established legal institutions to deal with, but
become political matters having to do with the preservation of
the State. I think he described very well how the State main-
tains an administrative network of controls, which, in most
instances, make it unnecessary for the State to resort to the
law to enforce conformity, and how, even when there are
infractions of established law, these can be dealt with by the
application of various pressures, without taking a person to
court.
But regardless of the extra-legal means of enforcing con-
formity, there is the criminal code, the legal system, to deal
with overt offenders; and therein alone lies one of the signifi-
cant differences of legal practice between the two systems -
that is, it is up to the State, in the Soviet Union, to decide
whether the law should be resorted to, in controlling the
society, rather than it being up to the society to decide when
it would resort to the law to control or limit the State, or to
seek the protection of the law when charged with crimes or
anti-social behaviour.
The established law is, indeed, the top of the iceberg, and
there are some very interesting things underneath this ice-
berg, including things which Professor Loeber didn't have
time to mention but no doubt would have if we had given him
more.
*Professor Schiebel holds degrees in International Relations, Russian Area
Studies and Russian History from the University of Washington in Seattle. He
has been a Senior Assistant and Charge-de-cours for the Institute for East
European Studies at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland and a Research
Associate in Russian History and Modem Chinese History at the University of
Washington. Professor Schiebel is currently the Director of the Russian Area
Studies Program at Georgetown University.
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As already mentioned, the judicial system, the law itself,
is only a part of the entire system of controls, formal and in-
formal, administrative and political. But even the judicial
institutions contain some unusual variants. There is a body
of legal institutions built up around anti-parasite laws and
comrade courts, which establish a whole system for dealing
with minor infraction, various forms of anti-social behavior
at the community level, through courts which are quasi-
judicial bodies, which are largely composed either of neigh-
borhood activists or of associates at work or in the collective
to which one belongs. These courts are extremely interesting
to study. They can be, of course, seen very positively as a
way in which the members of a society or a collective assist
one another in improving one's sense of cooperation and
participation in the achievement of common objectives. And
one can take the interpretation to the other side of the spect-
rum and describe them as, essentially, lynch law, where at
any given moment friends, neighbors and fellow workers (or
students) can be brought together to deal with conduct on the
part of an individual which the state simply doesn't approve
of.
Other means of controlling non-conformity can be found
outside the formal legal system. One very interesting thing
is the manifestation of big-time Mafia-type* crime in the
Soviet Union. Evidently this kind of crime is very, very
large. Some have estimated it to be much larger than in the
United States even in some past periods, and involving some
real "wheeling-dealing" of a very substantial nature. This
kind of crime appears to serve one particular purpose. It
appears to go on partially with the connivance of the State,
and it apparently makes available to the State the energies
and resources of some of the most ambitious individuals, the
kind of people who would not put forth the efforts required in
putting together modern and productive industrial enter-
prises, for simply a wage or for whatever other privileges
the State may be able to grant. So the regime allows some
people to enrich themselves enormously, in exchange for
putting forth unusual effort. At the same time, of course,
the State has enormous levers of control, not only the ob-
vious legal levers, but also psychological inhibitions.
*Mafia-type crime defined as the satisfaction of needs and wants of society
and economy by a system considered illegal under existing rules.
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Perhaps everyone in the Soviet system who has ever
accomplished anything of any significance has had to break
the law in order to do it. And while this makes these achiev-
ers legally vulnerable at all times, it has comparatively
rarely been necessary to invoke the laws against them,
because the feeling of guilt, the feeling of obligation, and
often immense psychological pressure, have been a significant
instrument in curbing non-conformity among the productive
and leadership elite.
At any rate, in talking about the law which is on the
surface, the formal judicial system and formal codified laws,
one might start out with a very interesting irony, one which
has already been alluded to several times in the previous
session. Soviet law very much resembles bourgeois institu-
tions and bourgeois formulations. This is most readily ap-
parent in the Soviet Constitution of 1936. And therein,
perhaps, may lie the explanation of the irony. On the surface,
the theoretical explanation of why Soviet law should be
formulated in essentially bourgeois terms is fairly simple.
During the period of transition to Socialism, Soviet doctrine
argues remnants of bourgeois relations remained, and in
order to regulate these relations, there have to be laws ade-
quate to deal with them.
But the promulgation of the Constitution was accom-
panied by the statement that the building of a socialist society
had been accomplished. And so it was precisely when so-
cialism supposedly had been built that new bourgeois laws
and bourgeois constitutional principles were promulgated.
And there we have, I think, a very significant irony. It has
been suggested, of course, that the reasons for doing this in
1936 was that the Soviet leadership anticipated requiring the
goodwill of liberal democratic western countries in the period
ahead, and that this was the kind of thing that would per-
suade them to come forth with their support, and I think
this is what has happened. Political scientists have suggested
that resort to these established bourgeois or western norms
and formulations has tended to legitimize the regime, or has
been intended to legitimize it, in the minds and attitudes of
those who are governed.
At any rate, the formal legal system appears to work
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relations which do not deal with challenges by members of
the society against the State, established law and norms of
procedure with which we are familiar have been employed,
and are performing their function.
The question of tradition was raised earlier, that is,
whether the absence of a historical base of legal traditions
handicapped or precluded the development of western style
legal systems or the rule of law in Communist societies.
The fact that an essentially western legal structure could be
imposed on a totalitarian society hostile to the west would
indicate that there was some basis on which it was accepted.
Laws were not exactly strange and new to the Soviet citizen.
The fact that a western legal system was offered to them in
order to get their support, would seem to be one indication
that there is a substantial tradition behind it, or that at least
the Soviet leaders thought so.
But when one looks for that tradition, one finds several
different traditions in Russia. There is the despotic, bureau-
cratic tradition. A society has for centuries been ruled by
administrative bureaucratic controls, providing a tradition in
which the idea of a society using the law to challenge or limit
the power of the State simply could not flourish. But then
there is the liberal tradition which began to grow in Russia
before, but particularly after 1905. It included the out-
standing lawyer Maklakov, who insisted that a Rechtsstaat,
i.e., the rule of law, not of men, had to be established before
Russia could progress, and the liberal leader Nilivkov who
eventually adopted the position that the existing system had
to be destroyed before new principles and institutions could
be established. Both had their followers, and both agreed
with each other and virtually everyone else that the new
Russia would have to be founded via a Constituent Assembly,
i.e., a legal and constitutional procedure. Their main objec-
tive appears to have been to establish a rule of law, whereby
society could limit and control the State.
There is also the tradition of reform, to which the au-
tocracy committed itself from 1861 on. The "Great Reforms"
gave Russia, among other things, a model legal and judiciary
system, whose only major defect was that it did not im-
mediately protect all citizens, and could not be freely used
to curb the State. The emerging Tsarist civil and criminal
system was intended to bring all proceedings under a uni-
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form code and due process, and to regulate and arbitrate
social and economic relations among individuals and groups
in society. This legal tradition, of course, came to an untimely
end after 1917, and many of those who upheld the tradition
were either driven from the country or were destroyed. The
Tsarist State had worked hard and with some success to
implant the roots of this tradition. The Bolsheviks, being
root and branch revolutionaries, replaced it with their So-
cialist legal system and in the process restored much of the
old despotic bureaucratic tradition as well.
There are other legal legacies, Church law being one of
them. There seems to be a basis in Russian tradition for a
variety of legal systems, and it may be argued that Russia
neither needed nor was doomed inevitably to live under
Communist law; that more time was needed to allow existing
alternative traditions to grow. One issue involved in this
is whether we're looking upon the law as a way of regulating
the normal relations between individuals and groups and cor-
porations within a society, or whether we're looking at the
law as a way whereby the society protects itself against the
State or overwhelming conglomerations of power. In the
case of the former, I think that there is some reason to be
encouraged by the administration of justice in the Soviet
Union or East European Communist countries; in the case of
the latter, there is much reason to be discouraged.
One of the areas over which one may, indeed, be dis-
couraged concerns the continuing use of the legal process and
legal institutions, as well as extralegal procedures, to confine
to insane asylums people who patently are not insane, unless
one uses a very strange formula for determining insanity
that formula going something like this: "Anybody who
would resist a State which is that powerful has to be insane!"
These methods are not new; what is disturbing is that in-
creasingly and broader application of legality in the Soviet
Union cannot curb them effectively.
One other issue which deserves greater attention is the
claim of the State that, when it deals with certain offenses on
the part of a citizen against institutions, people or property, it
is not protecting the State against evildoers, but is protecting
the people instead. In this way a crime against State prop-
erty, an offense against a State official, or any expression of




Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
phrase has been around at least since the French Revolution,
and it is an ominous phrase. Crimes against the people is
the one kind of conduct, in radical or revolutionary ideology,
which cannot be tolerated and merits total and merciless
repression. Enemies against the State, enemies against other
groups, enemies against other individuals, violators of various
norms of behavior, can be tried, excused, rehabilitated, or
punished. But enemies of the people need to be destroyed.
This formula has not been frequently invoked recently, but
it exists, can be applied, and threatens with annihilation
anyone proclaiming total non-conformity, or undermining the
power of the State.
A final point: The law is seldom used, as Professor
Loeber has pointed out. But in all cases, the law is in reserve.
The law can be used if advisable and if other means fail.
But the State decides, not the individual.
Now, I want to close with a rather grisly kind of a re-
minder of what, to me, constitutes one of the questions we
have to deal with, whether we are talking of a judicial es-
tablishment which tries to help regulate the interactions of
the various peoples and groups in a society, according to
established norms, or whether we are dealing with the legal
establishment in the sense of an institution which defends
the State against the people, or the people against the State.
Some years ago there was a movie called "Judgment at
Nuremberg"; and you may recall, even if you haven't seen
the movie, the problem: The German judges, who went
about their business after 1933 of administering justice, of
trying to enforce rights and laws, are charged with having
neglected the bigger issue, the question of whom or what the
law served. In the end, whether they knew it or not, many
judges and advocates who administered justice and sought
equity at the level of relations among the people, ended up
being parties to a system which gave to the State all of the
advantages, and to the society none of it. Once this rule of
the State was established, the law could be and was perverted
for political ends, and the crimes of the State could be and
were condoned. This constituted the moral crisis of the
German legal profession, and it compromises the legal pro.
fession in the Soviet Union today.
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